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INTRODUCTION
Proposals for the establishment of an Indigenous advisory body 
within the Australian Constitution are genuinely innovative and 
exciting.1 Designing such a body is a challenge. Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Australians have long sought better political 
representation.2 Indigenous Australians constitute approximately 
3 per cent of the population, therefore—even with proportionate 
reserved seats—such a micro-minority will struggle to assert 
itself in the Federal Parliament. For this and other reasons, the 
Cape York Institute rejected proposals for reserved seats in the 
Federal Parliament as unworkable.3 Noel Pearson expressed the 
dilemma well:
There’s no way that we’re going to regularly have members to speak 
on our behalf in the parliament, and yet parliament is regularly making 
laws about us. So a provision which makes us part of the formal process 
of parliament, I think that has got to be part of the discussion.4
A constitutional Indigenous advisory body is one way of resolving 
that dilemma. 
THE PROPOSAL
A crucial feature of the proposed body is that it would be non-
binding:
[T]he new Chapter [of the Constitution] could be drafted such that the 
advice of the Indigenous body is highly persuasive and authoritative, 
but not binding on Parliament. It would not constitute a veto over 
Parliament’s law making. It would therefore not derogate from 
parliamentary sovereignty in any way.5
Professor Anne Twomey has put forward a draft chapter 1A which 
would be inserted into the Constitution following a referendum.6 
Twomey’s draft definitively demonstrates that it is possible to 
constitutionally realise the Cape York Institute’s vision for a body 
that would ‘not derogate from parliamentary sovereignty in any 
way.’7 The proposed article 60A would ‘fit’ within the Australian 
Constitution. 
Twomey has noted that:
[t]he critical provision in the chapter is sub-section 60A(4). It imposes 
the obligation on the two houses of parliament of giving ‘consideration 
to the tabled advice of the [body] in debating proposed laws with 
respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’.8
In terms of constitutional design, the beauty of this proposal is that 
it grants Indigenous Australians a voice in the parliamentary process 
whilst respecting the democratic will of Parliament. Some have 
questioned the potential for a non-binding advisory body to have 
any material impact.9 I have argued that ‘[a] representative body – 
correctly constituted – could deliver meaningfully for Indigenous 
Australians. Undoubtedly such a body would lack legal authority 
– its advice is non-binding – but it could have political authority.’10
THE DIGNITY OF THE INSTITUTION
The architects of this proposal envisage a body which is ‘highly 
persuasive and authoritative, but not binding on Parliament’.11 It 
is a core tenet of the proposal that Parliament ought to be free to 
set aside the advice of the body after careful consideration. The 
body’s advice cannot be made binding because it would lack the 
democratic mandate to impose its will on the Parliament. On the 
other hand, there is no point in seeking to establish a body which 
would be routinely ignored. If the proposed system was functioning 
appropriately we would expect to see polite interactions between 
the Parliament and the body. There should be an expectation that 
Parliament will comply with the recommendations of the body. On 
those occasions when the Federal Parliament exercises its right to 
set aside the advice of the body, there ought to be a respectful 
explanation when it opted to set aside that advice. 
Professor George Williams is sceptical about the potential for a 
non-binding body to gain traction in our parliamentary democracy. 
He says:
The problem for Indigenous peoples is not only that parliamentarians 
have been willing to ignore them in the past, but that political parties 
can gain popularity in the broader electorate by being seen to act 
contrary to the wishes of minorities such as asylum seekers and 
Indigenous peoples.12
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Professor Cheryl Saunders is more positive, but she too is 
concerned. She argues that in ‘reality… the Australian political 
culture is very bad indeed at genuine consultation either with the 
public at large or with groups affected by particular proposals’.13 
Professors Saunders and Williams raised valid concerns. Statutory 
bodies and even parliamentary committees are routinely ignored 
by the Parliament. The strong cohesion and discipline of the 
Australian political system mitigates against in-depth debate on 
the floor of Parliament.14 To counteract these concerns it will be 
important to ensure that there is a political cost associated with 
ignoring the advice of the body. 
The UK House of Lords (‘House’ or ‘Upper House’) provides an 
instructive lesson in political authority. The Upper House of the 
UK Parliament differs from the Australian Senate in three key ways, 
which might be said to impact on its political authority. 
Firstly, it was not established by plebiscite and lacks any claim to 
a popular constituent act. Compounding that fact, the House of 
Lords is unelected—it therefore lacks democratic legitimacy. Finally, 
since the Parliament Act 1911 (UK), the House does not possess a 
legislative veto, it can only delay legislation. 
In 1997, there were 749 hereditary peers who sat in the Upper 
House due to accident of birth. The House of Lords Act 1999 (UK) 
reduced the number of hereditary peers to 92. Professor Meg 
Russell has noted that since that reform the House has acted with 
greater confidence and has been more active in amending and 
delaying legislation. She attributes that increased confidence, in 
part at least, to the increased legitimacy stemming from the 1999 
reforms.15 The influence of the House Lords is derived from its 
political authority.
The political cost of ignoring the body will also correlate with 
its political authority. In part that will derive from the extent to 
which the body is able to insert itself into the political life (and 
imagination) of the nation. The procedures of the body and the 
manner in which its members interact with the government and 
opposition will need to be worked through so that it can present 
itself as an institution of the Constitution and integrated element of 
the parliamentary process. Building up gravitas and the necessary 
parliamentary conventions will take time, but the body will have 
some distinct benefits in this regard.
THE CONSTITUENT ACT
Professor Gabrielle Appleby has explored various potential 
mechanisms for establishing bodies such as the proposed body.16 
No matter which precise mechanism is adopted it is crucial that 
the body be placed on a constitutional footing. While it might be 
possible to create an advisory body by way of ordinary legislation, 
this body should not be established in that way. To have authority—
political authority—the body must be established by referendum. 
Carl Schmitt powerfully argued, ‘[d]emocratic theory knows as a 
legitimate constitution only the one which rests on the constituent 
power of the people’. 17 Schmitt’s reasoning points at the collective 
origin of constitutional laws. In a democratic regime, the legitimacy 
of the fundamental norms and institutions depends on how 
inclusive the participation of the citizens is during the extraordinary 
and exceptional moment of constitution making.
The Australian Constitution itself was the result of the participation 
of citizens in a moment of constitution making:
The Australian nation itself was brought about in a special way. 
When the Constitution came into force on 1 January 1901, it had a 
unique claim to popular authority. In what for the time was a radical 
experiment in direct democracy, the Constitution was approved by 
the people of the colonies in a series of referendums.18
To have real authority the body must benefit from a similar 
constituent act of the Australian public. It is vital that the body 
be able to point to the moment of its creation as a conferring 
legitimacy—it must be able to point to a constituent act of 
the Australian people. Disregarding the body will require the 
Parliament to actively ignore an institution uniquely created by 
the express will of the people. There will be a political cost to 
disregarding the advice of this body which does not apply to other 
scrutiny committees or statutory bodies. Unlike the Human Rights 
Commission or the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, this body will derive its authority from the people. 
THE NEED FOR AN ENGAGED CONSTITUENCY
To have any meaningful authority the body must be a creature 
of the Constitution established by referendum. But being a 
constitutional institution brings no guarantees. Section 101 of 
the Constitution provides for an Inter-State Commission. Despite 
that constitutional footing the Inter-State Commission no longer 
exists. The Constitution had sought to vest the Commission with 
the power to ‘administer and adjudicate’ as to ‘the execution and 
maintenance ... of the provisions of the Constitution relating to 
trade and commerce’.19  In the Wheat Case the High Court ruled that 
If a body emerges as the preferred 
model it is crucial that Indigenous 
Australians have a sense of 
ownership over it.
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vesting the Inter-State Commission with judicial power constituted 
a breach of the separation of powers and was constitutionally 
invalid.20 As a result of that ruling, the Commission lost purpose 
and it was gradually allowed to wither on the constitutional vine. 
Some fear that the Indigenous advisory body would face a similar 
fate. However the proposed body is different to the Inter-State 
Commission. As the Twomey draft demonstrates it will have 
no legislative or judicial power.21 It is fully compliant with the 
separation of powers. 
In addition, the body will be different from the Inter-State 
Commission and other statutory and parliamentary bodies 
because it will have a constituency: Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples. Indigenous Australians will rightly insist that their 
representative body be treated respectfully by the Parliament.22
CONCLUSION
In truth, the existence of a constituent act and a constituency do 
not guarantee the effective operation of the body. As was noted 
earlier, Prof Williams has pointed out that all too often ‘political 
parties can gain popularity in the broader electorate by being seen 
to act contrary to the wishes of minorities such as asylum seekers 
and Indigenous peoples’.23 The risk, as articulated by Prof Williams, is 
that ignoring the body will provide a perverse boost to government 
popularity. That is a depressing prospect. The referendum process, 
the constituent act and the existence of an engaged constituency 
should all be marshalled to counter that prospect. 
On 3 August 2015 the Prime Minister rejected calls by Indigenous 
leaders to establish community conferences to consider the 
best way forward for constitutional reform.24 That opposition is 
regrettable. If a body emerges as the preferred model it is crucial 
that Indigenous Australians have a sense of ownership over it which 
will come with a strong input to its design. That will contribute to 
the sense of constituency for the resulting body. The positivity 
surrounding such a process could be utilised in the referendum 
process to convince the wider public of the merits of this proposal—
one which delivers meaningfully for Indigenous Australians whilst 
fitting into the existing constitutional structures. The political 
authority of a body will rest upon the existence of a constituent act 
and an engaged constituency. Without those features Prof Williams’ 
fears are likely to be realised. But there is an alternative vision:
Constituent politics might be seen as the explicit, lucid self-institution 
of society, whereby the citizens are jointly called to be the authors of 
their constitutional identity and to decide the central rules and higher 
procedures that will regulate their political and social life.25
A referendum is an opportunity to recast political and social life in 
Australia. An Indigenous advisory body is an opportunity to recast 
our democratic institutions so that Indigenous Australians are given 
a place in the Constitution and a voice in the parliamentary process. 
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